The first time I saw an American prepare for a hurricane I was standing in a grocery store in Northern Virginia watching a man load a flatbed cart with water. Not a case of water — three cases, stacked, plus two additional individual gallons set on top like a crown. The cart also held batteries in multiple sizes, three industrial flashlights, two large boxes of non-perishables, and a hand-crank radio in a red box.
It was October 2012. Hurricane Sandy was coming.
I had been in America for sixteen months. By then I had been through basic training and AIT at Fort Leonard Wood — the military had its own emergency preparedness doctrine, its own supply logic, its own way of institutionalising the response to the large thing before the large thing arrived. I understood preparedness as a concept. What I had not seen was preparedness as consumer behaviour.
The hurricane aisle is not labelled as such. It is the confluence of several ordinary product categories — bottled water, batteries, flashlights, canned goods — that becomes, in the week before a major storm, a single purposeful space. Strangers compared notes on generator capacity. A woman asked a man which batteries lasted longest and he answered without hesitation, because he had had this conversation before.
What struck me was the competence. Not panic, not confusion, but a calm and practised efficiency suggesting this was a known problem with a known protocol. The military had taught me that preparedness required instruction and repetition. What the grocery store was showing me was that civilian America had its own version — less formal, transmitted laterally rather than from doctrine, but just as embedded.
The preparedness infrastructure is most legible to people from places without it. In Kenya, a flood happens and the response is improvised, immediate, collective, and exhausting — everyone doing what they can because there is no prior arrangement. In America, the arrangement pre-exists the disaster. The supplies are in the store. The routes are on the signs. The protocol is understood. This is a different answer to the same problem: what do you do when the large thing comes? America’s answer is to have already decided, at scale, in advance. The cost of this answer is the assumption that the large thing will always behave as anticipated. Sandy did not behave as anticipated.
I bought one case of water and a flashlight. The concept of a storm large enough to require three cases of water was still theoretical in my body even if understood in my head.
Sandy hit. The power went out for two days. The damage further north was severe.
What I remember from those two days was not the darkness but the neighbours. People who had not spoken to me in sixteen months knocked on doors. Food was shared. The cluster geometry softened. The disaster did what disasters sometimes do — provided a common condition, and the common condition temporarily dissolved the invisible walls between clusters.
The hurricane aisle had prepared people for the practical problem. Nobody had prepared anyone for the social one, and yet it resolved itself, briefly and genuinely, in the dark.
These notes were made between June 2011 and the present.
I started writing them down in 2026.
The gap is not an absence — it is the difference between experiencing something
and understanding it well enough to put it on a page.
◆ YEAR IN KENYA SERIES
This essay is part of the Year in Kenya series — twelve months in Nairobi, April 2025 to April 2026.
The analytical home for the series is gabrielmahia.com, where Gabriel writes on power, institutions, and what holds under pressure. The full reading order — essays across five properties — is at the Year in Kenya series page.
◆ Year in Kenya — Field Series 2025–2026
Twelve months in Nairobi waiting on a a spousal visa, watching Kenya's Gen Z protests, Tanzania's 2025 election, and an American political realignment simultaneously — from the position of someone inside neither country and reading both.
Full reading order → gabrielmahia.com · gabrielmahia.com